Frida Olea Essays - Montagnards, Jacobins, French People

Frida Olea Period. 5 11/17/2016 Mini-Q Essay The Reign of Terror: Was It Justified? Severed heads, countless corpses and terror in the streets, does the French Revolution sound justified to you? The French Revolution lasted 18 months, starting in January 1793 to late July 1794. During that time 20,000 people were killed by using the guillotine, including king Louis XVI. Does the French Revolution still sound justified to you? The Reign of Terror was not justified. This claim can be supported by looking at the external threats, internal threats, and methods used. The external threat was not serious enough to justify the Reign of Terror. They denied legal representation to people, they would just kill them on the spot. Some of the soldiers didn't even agree with some of the things their own government was doing so they left and fought against France for other countries. This evidence shows that the Reign of Terror was not justified because they were killing everything, even innocent citizens. Soldiers didn't even agree with it. The internal threat was also not serious enough to justify the reign of Terror. Many french people rebelled against revolution. These rebels opposed attacks against the church which ended Christmas and Easter,it was not serious enough to abolish two Holidays. Also, opposed draft laws that forced even women and childs to play a role (Doc C). Later sign a military draft, and then if they refused to join the army they would kill them. To set an example to counter revolutionaries they destroyed 1600 homes and chopped off 12 heads in just 5 minutes. These government changes were tyrannical, people in places ;like the vendee had a right to rebel. Basic freedoms were denied; terror was used against them. This evidence shows that the Reign of Terror was not justified because they were way too cruel. The response of The Reign of Terror to the external and internal threats was inappropriate, too extreme. Revolutionary government hired spies and set up tribunals Guillotined which convicted people in public. If the committee of public safety had only suspicion that you were a counter revolutionary, they might kill you, they executed 35,000-40,000 people in just the countryside, in front of a huge crowd (Doc F). They might suspect you a counter revolutionaries if you make criticism against the government. Robespierre, the leader of the Terror until its last days, argued that you had to "smother" the enemies of the Revolution to protect liberty. This is like killing the goose to get the golden egg. These responses by the Reign of Terror were not justified because it's not okay to kill anyone on suspicion or for your own good. One might say that they were justified in their responses to conflicts, because people had to die in order for the revolution to be a success. It was understandable that the revolutionaries wanted stability, it was not justifiable to execute thousands to reach this goal. Also, it didn't work, Rosbespierre himslef ended up being executed by the guillotine. The Reign of Terror had a lot of conflict both internally and externally. The government had to respond to it. But it was not justified to execute innocent people just because they suspected them to be counter revolutionary citizens. Then to make matters worse they were forcing citizens to be soldiers. They had to pick to be a soldier or dead, so either way they picked death or death. However, the revolution was successful in making a republic government.

Jet task 2 Essays

Jet task 2 Essays Jet task 2 Essay Jet task 2 Essay jet 2 Task 2 There are a few areas of concern with the Budget that Competition Bike, Inc. has displayed within their budget for year 9. The most prominent area of concern in is in the Revenue section of the budget. In the budget for year 9, Competition has included units sold to be 3510. This is a lofty prediction given that year 8 had seen such a big decline in that number. In year 8, Competition sold 3400 units, but the previous year had sold around 4000 units, a 15 % decline. The company is hoping for n upswing, but this may be too positive of an estimation. To go with that, Competition is only allowing for $984 more dollars in advertising for year 9. If they had budgeted maybe $2000-$3000 more to this category to get to where their advertising spending was in year 7 when they sold 4000 units, their budget of increased sales in year 9 would not be as suspect. In the Budgeted Income Statement, Competition Bikes has budgeted $1340038 for Selling, General, and Administrative Expenses. This is a little high as in year 7, when he highest number of units was sold, that category totaled $1322075. Sometimes this number is budgeted high to help show how well the company managed the budget, as they have built in extra that they know that they can beat. This is not in the best interest of the company, however, because the goal is not aggressively set, and there is no real push to beat the budgeted amount. The other concern with this area is that a lot of the key components in this category should remain relatively similar to revious years. For example, Executive Compensation, Employment taxes, Payroll Service, Depreciation Expense, and Administrative Salaries were the exact same for Years 7 8. Given that these should remain the same in year 9; it is unclear why the company is budgeting more than $50,000 in this area than the previous year. I would suggest that the budgeted amount be somewhere between the year 7 8 amounts, given the positive prediction that sales will increase, which would put it between $1273867 and $1322075. This over statement in this category has also led to the company to under budget their Operating Income which they have budgeted at $80585. With the prediction of selling more units than year 8, the company should be budgeting a higher Operating Income than the previous years amount of $97,533. They definitely should not be indicating that they will be selling more but making less. This would be a bad financial sign for the company, as it is showing a lack of leadership and management skills. Jet task 2 By wahabfun

Advertising psychology Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2250 words

Advertising psychology - Essay Example In fact, medium through which ideas are expressed is not relevant, what matters is the nature of messages communicated to customers by these companies. Self-determination of this company is manifested through their effort and culture expressed in each of their offices. This company altered its brand from Wieden & Kennedy, Inc in May 2003, which was established during its founding in 1982, in Portland, Oregon (Businessweek, 2013, 1). Nevertheless, this agency has managed to offer their marketing services through offices located in countries such as Netherlands, Britain, America, Japan, China, Brazil and India. This agency has been managed by different managing directors since its founding; for instance, Luhr was one of the managing directors who headed this agency since in 1992 after working for a period of six years and later he became a partner (Businessweek, 2013, 1). On the other hand, Wieden+Kennedy has been involved in promotions of big companies such as Nike.Therefore, this pap er analyses â€Å"Jordan BE Lifestyle Campaign† in order to discuss the topic of advertising psychology. Jordan BE Lifestyle Campaign was aimed at creating a genuine reason for Jordan Lifestyle Apparel Collection, whereby it is focused on establishing a contemporary and culturally relevant gyrate on the legacy and life of Michael Jordan (Effie Awards, 2007, 2).... yle attire category; in fact, this campaign focuses on generation of additional media impression and talk value among the principal consumers in the fashion industry (Effie Awards, 2007, 2). The campaign was also focused on generating thirty percent sale of Jordan Brand Collection attire through a credible establishment of a brand as lifestyle alternatives for customers. 2. Psychological Theory Various distinctive theories of advertising have been discerned by numerous scholars since 1900s (Loken, 2006, 454). In fact, researchers had a conviction that understanding of psychological theories in marketing would derive a significant way of conducting a systematic analysis of trade instead of relying on chances or instinct. Especially, in the America, advertising has become a serious industry; for instance, in 2007, there was one hundred and forty nine billion spent on advertisements by different companies (Effie Awards, 2007, 1). Nevertheless, study in the field of advertising theories commenced in 1903, whereby a research was conducted in psychological laboratory of Northwestern University (Loken, 2006, 460). Nevertheless, some of psychological approaches that could be applied in advertising are indentified and they have increasingly developed significantly (Lau-Gesk, 2003, 301). Therefore, this section will seek to analyze some of the psychological theories applied in â€Å"Jordan BE Lifestyle Campaign† by Wieden+Kennedy, Inc. In fact, these theories are focused on applying elements such as strategic communication and psychological alternation in potential of various customers (Cox & Cox, 2001, 103). 3. Cognitive psychology theories Cognitive psychology theories applicable to this advertisement focused on the form of self-referencing that could be utilized by the

MGT Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 6

MGT - Essay Example When workers are happy, they enjoy their work and this is more preferable than using other systems to improve productivity. This paper will provide evidence that happy or satisfied workers are more productive in the workplaces. Ropella highlights that there are factors that influence and contribute to employee satisfaction. The first factor is the work environment and it is concerned with the internal working environment of the employees. This environment entails feelings and attitudes on their colleague employees and the job itself. It is important for the employees to feel included in the larger organizational team to enhance productivity. The second factor is the ability to achieve the desired organizational objectives and it is concerned with the determination of the employee’s capacity and potential to achieve the set goals in their work. The other factor is the rewards and compensation for work done by the employees. Recognition for a good job done creates a feeling of happiness and motivation towards productivity. Business knowledge is another factor and it is concerned with the necessity of informing the employees on how the business works and on the finances of the organization. When employ ees are aware of the operations of the business, it enhances their productivity. The last factor is client relations and it is concerned with good relationships between customers and the employees. When the relations are favorable, employees are motivated to perform better. Furthermore, Kjerulf highlights various reasons why satisfied or happy workers at the workplace are more productive. The first reason is that happy workers work better with others in the workplace to enhance productivity. In this case, when employees are happy, they are more fun to work with other people hence improving working relations, which translate to higher productivity. The second reason is that workers satisfaction enhances creativity at work. Happy workers are able to generate

Human identity and relationships Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Human identity and relationships - Assignment Example Evidently, from the film there are instances of distortion on the character Shaw by the mother. On that note, she is seen referring to him as his little monster. In addition to that, the film also outlines the discrimination and the misinformation regarding punks as a possible source of stigma. The underserving of the population on the basis of the provision of essential services has contributed to the development of stigma in the society. Apparently, through the unequal serving of the population due to the inequity of resource distribution, stigma development has been boosted greatly. Apparently, the onset of mental conditions for instance stress and anxiety serve to drive an individual to engage into drug and alcoholism which consequently, leads to addiction thus when diagnosed, the two conditions are present. Notably, the model describes a simple way of enhancing the resilience in order to boosting the mental health. On the same point, mental health can be boosted through the promotion of resilience strategies and the minimizing of adverse experiences in the childhood stage. 10. What are some examples that you use for your own self-care in tending to your mental well-being. (Identify whether positive or negative)on the positive side, the engagement in playing computer games aids in the exercising my brain thus inhibiting the onset of mental conditions. Om the contrary, I enjoy watching movies over night as opposed to sleeping which serves to impact negatively on my mental

The obligation to obey the law the normative

The obligation to obey the law the normative The obligation to obey the law the normative phenomenon in jurisprudence. Introduction: This dissertation aims to provide a general discourse into the normative jurisprudential phenomenon of political obligation. The debate surrounding the issue of whether or not there exists a general obligation to obey the law shall be defined and described, and the arguments of the different positions within this debate shall then be summarised at length, and critically analysed. The author shall then engage with this debate and provide his own opinions as to the correct approach to take when tackling the important question of whether or not there is an obligation to obey the law. Defining the scope of the debate: Before we attempt to define the scope of this debate, it is important to first understand the nature of the obligation in question, and also the characteristics of the duty arising from that obligation. The nature of the obligation: A moral or legal obligation? Jurists are not often concerned with the legal duty to obey the law, after all, such a notion is circular and meaningless; of course the law imposes a legal duty on its citizens to obey it. As Alexy[1] notes, â€Å"†¦ in the praxis of any system of dominion there is an implicit claim to correctness, which must be redeemed to anybody. A normative system which does not raise a claim to correctness explicitly or implicitly is not a legal system.† Neither can the law provide ultimate reasons for action, just as a parent will be unable to explain to their perpetually inquisitive child why they must not steal without recourse to the underlying morality of the actions involved in such a crime. As Nino[2] notes, â€Å"Legal norms do not by themselves constitutive reasons for justifying actions and decisions (like those of judges), unless they are conceived as deriving from moral judgments; normative propositions that exhibit the distinctive traits of autonomy, justificatory finality, universalisability, generality, supervinience and finality†. Therefore, rather than an assessment of the legal obligations to obey the law, most[3] jurists are instead concerned with the moral aspect of this obligation; are we always morally obliged to obey the law, and if not, in which situations may such a moral duty be deemed non-existent? The characteristics of the duty arising from this obligation: An absolute duty, or merely a prima facie one? To argue that there is an absolute duty to obey the law is to simultaneously suggest that in the case of every law, the moral reasons for obeying such law could never be outweighed by moral reasons pointing to disobedience. Such a position seems to pay no regard to notions of individual autonomy. As Menendez[4] writes, â€Å"if we consider it as providing an absolute reason, then we cannot any longer see it as part and parcel of the exercise of our practical reason, but as an alternative to it.† On the other hand, if we are to argue that the only duty that exists is a prima facie one, i.e. that a duty can be said to exist until it is rebutted by an assessment of the moral content of the law, then we are in essence suggesting that the law will only impose an obligation upon us where we as individuals are able to agree with the morality underlying the law in question. Such a position seems to pay little regard to the need of a legal system to be generally obeyed in order for it to successfully perform its roles of conflict solving and social co-ordination. As Raz[5] writes: â€Å"legal norms are reasons for acting, and not merely statements to the effect that there are reasons for acting.† The actual characteristics of the duty in question must lie somewhere between these two positions; the law must respect the processes of individual reasoning, but at the same time must impose obligations upon its citizens, at least to the extent that the system is able to retain social order and manage social conflict. As we shall observe later in this essay, different jurists have their own opinions of where the balance should be perceived to lie, although as we shall also see, this position tends to be nearer a notion of a prima facie duty, than that of an absolute duty. With these considerations in mind, let us now briefly attempt to define the scope of this jurisprudential debate. Defining the scope of the debate There is a divide amongst legal philosophers over the fundamental question of whether or not there is an obligation to obey the law. Some jurists, such as Rawls[6], Finnis[7] and Honorà ©[8], argue that the law always has prima facie authority over its citizens, i.e. that before the content of a law is assessed, it is morally right to comply- albeit that it may later be qualified. For the sake of later discussion, let us refer to this position as position 1. Other legal philosophers such as Smith[9], have rejected this position arguing that whether or not there is such a duty to obey the law depends entirely upon which law in question is being obeyed/disobeyed i.e. that only sometimes will there be a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law [Position 2]. Between these two positions lie the opinions of jurists such as Raz[10], who argues for a more or less general prima facie obligation to obey the law, and Greenawalt[11], who, as mentioned earlier, offers an interesting alternative view which tries to show how there could be legitimate authority without a moral obligation to obey the law, a theory which is co ntrary to the working assumption of this paper that the nature of the obligation in question must be a moral one. At this point in my dissertation I would like to make some more general points about the issue of whether or not there is a duty to obey the law, in particular to make some remarks about the irreconcilability of this question with the basic tenets of legal positivism. Critics of positivism have often voiced their concerns over this very point; they argue that if the claims which positivism makes are correct about the separation of laws and morals, then there can never be a moral obligation to obey the law which arises because of the law. In other words, they cannot suggest that the law must be obeyed without resorting to some other authority other than the law itself. Lon Fuller, a natural lawyer, is one of these critics, as is Feinberg[12], who argues that: â€Å"The positivist account of legal validity is hard to reconcile with the claim that valid law as such, no matter what its content, deserves our respect and general fidelity. Even if valid law is bad law, we have some obligation to obey it simply because it is law. But how can this be so if a law's validity has nothing to do with its content?† In many respects this is an argument that is hard to dispel. Certain contemporary positivists have even accepted, such as Himma[13], that positivism is irreconcilable with a notion of a duty to obey the law arising from the mere fact that it is the law. He argues that a citizen has a moral obligation to obey laws which contain norms worthy of moral obedience, such as those law prohibiting theft, murder, and even laws which are necessary to retain certain levels of human control, such as driving offences, but admits that a law creates no moral duty of obedience simply on the basis that it is the law. The result of this admission is as follows; positivists have been forced to seek out justifications for a prima facie obligation to obey the law, and have done so, quite unsuccessfully [as we shall now see], through reference to arguments based on gratitude, fairness, social contract via implied consent and utilitarian arguments pertaining to the common good. Let us now discuss the intricacies of these position 1 arguments in more detail, and critically analyse some of the justifications that have been offered by these leading jurists in support of their position. Defending position [1]: there is a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law. Four concepts have been advanced as giving rise to this duty[14]; 1] Gratitude; 2] Promise-Keeping; 3] Fairness, and; 4] Promotion of the Common Good. Let us assess each of these concepts in turn: Gratitude: The basic concept underlying this justification for a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law is as follows: In light of the great benefits which the law has conferred upon its citizens, those citizens should obey those laws, unless there is a good reason not to in a particular case. Promise-Keeping: This concept suggests that any citizen who enjoys the benefits and protections of the law commits him or herself to a social contract, which states that in return for such benefits they will obey the law. In this way a citizen is morally obliged to obey the law unless they have good reasons to the contrary. John Rawls[15] was a strong proponent of this thesis, although his formulation was somewhat more sophisticated than the reasoning above: He asserted that a society is just if it is governed by principles which people would have agreed to in a state of ignorance about their own particular position in society. He went on to argue that a natural consequence of this ‘veil of ignorance’ is a natural duty to obey the law; where the society is just (or nearly just), then there is a ‘natural duty’ of all citizens to support and further just institutions, because they would be collectively labelled right by the very people that are governed by them. Under Rawls’ theory, the duty exists independently from the promise to obey that which is required of them by an institution in a just society, because behind their ‘veil of ignorance,’ people would have agreed to it. In this way Rawls manages to justify the existence of a duty to obey, even where a pa rticular law is not particularly just, provided the basic structure of the society is reasonably just. Rawls does not advocate an absolute duty however; he argues that where a particular law exceeds certain limits of injustice, conscientious refusal is warranted, or even civil disobedience, should the injustice reach blatant levels. 3] Fairness This argument is twofold; firstly, in light of all the benefits that the law confers on its citizens, it would be unfair for a citizen not to obey them, and; secondly, a citizen has a duty to obey the law, not because that citizen owes anything to the government, but because he or she owes something to his or her fellow citizens; if everyone else complies with the law, then it is not fair for one citizen not to, whilst at the same time still receiving the benefit which that law confers. In essence therefore, under this concept, there are two tests that must be satisfied before it can be said that a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law has been established on the grounds of fairness. Firstly, the law must have generally beneficial effects; and secondly, most citizens must obey the law, so that a citizen would be taking an unfair advantage should he or she decide not to. The latter part of this test is identical to the argument offered by Dworkin[16] in justification of his general moral duty to obey the law; Dworkin asserts that a man is under a moral duty to obey the law for reasons of fairness, as outlined above, but at the same time, that same man may also be under conflicting duties other than those he owes to the state, such as to God and his own conscience; if these further duties conflict with his duties to the state, then Dworkin argues that such a man is entitled to do what he judges to be right. 4] Promotion of the Common Good: This ground for the existence of a prima facie duty is grounded in the ideals of utilitarianism; if citizens break the law then the collective welfare of society will diminish: therefore citizens are morally obliged to obey the law. The disadvantage suffered by one citizen through giving to obey the law should, under this reasoning, be balanced against the benefit conferred to society as a whole by his compliance. Finnis[17] is one of the main proponents of this theory, although his reasoning does go somewhat further than the simple utilitarian approaches offered above. Finnis argues that fulfilling legal obligations is necessary for the common good, simply because the common good is the good of individuals. Having described and understood all of the possible justifications promoted for the existence of a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law [position 1], let us now return to each of them and offer some critical analysis: Defeating Position [1]: no prima facie moral duty to obey the law can be justified via the concepts of gratitude, promise-keeping, fairness or the promotion of the common good: 1] Gratitude: Whilst gratitude in its normal everyday meaning might indeed lead to certain moral obligations, never has it been suggested that as a direct result of gratitude one should do everything that is asked of you. It is for this reason that this ground is weak, and does not adequately justify a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law. 2] Promise-Keeping: It is instantly obvious that no general prima facie duty could ever be said to exist by virtue of the basic promise-keeping rationale; unlike a party to a contract, a citizen has no real choice as to which country he or she belongs, and therefore even though that citizen may indeed receive benefits, be given the chance to vote, and be subjected to a just social structure, there is nothing embedded in the process of receiving these benefits which would lead one to automatically assume the imposition of a promise to obey. Therefore, I do not agree that a general prima facie obligation to obey the law can be derived by way of this rationale. 3] Fairness: This justification for a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law relies heavily upon an idea that all law confers benefits; an anarchist however may argue that the state produces no such benefits. Also, it is difficult to the concept of ‘fairness’ to a legal constraint which actually does no-one any good: if this type of case is frequently occurring, then the analysis of fairness as day to day co-operative transactions will break down. 4] Promotion of the Common Good: Whichever brand of utilitarianism one chooses to apply to this concept, the same conclusion results; ‘promotion of the common good’ cannot be used to justify the existence of a prima facie duty to obey the law: Act-Utilitarianism: The very mechanics of act-utilitarianism require a balancing act of all the positive and negative attributes of a certain action before deciding which course would be in the interests of the common good; to decide whether or not a duty to obey the law exists will therefore depend upon which particular law is in question. As such, there can be no prima facie obligation to obey the law via this concept. Rule-Utilitarianism: The very mechanics of rule-utilitarianism suggest that an action is right if it is required by a rule where general observance of that rule would have the best consequences. Following on from this, it makes sense that a rule requiring one to obey (with certain exceptions) would probably have better consequences than a rule requiring one always to obey. The process of formulating a comprehensive list of such exceptions would in effect require an assessment using the same mechanisms as relevant to act-utilitarianism, and as such, the same criticisms to a prima facie duty will apply. It should be noted that these criticisms do no necessarily serve to destroy the arguments of Finnis; Finnis argues that that fulfilling legal obligations is necessary for the common good, simply because the common good is the good of individuals. This is a theory that I will address in more detail at a later point in this dissertation. For now, we should simply be satisfied that any justifications based upon act- or rule- utilitarianism cannot be successful in establishing the existence of a general prima facie duty to obey the law. In essence, the criticisms of act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism do not preclude there ever being a duty to obey the law, merely that the existence of such a duty can only be determined with reference to each particular law. This leads us back to our earlier discussion of ‘position 2’ jurists, those such as Smith[18], who argue that whether or not there is such a duty to obey the law depends entirely upon which law in question is being obeyed/disobeyed i.e. that only sometimes will there be a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law. Before we go on to discuss the rationales that have been offered in support of position 2, let us first take a brief look at the work of George Klosko[19], and his multiple principle theory of political obligation: George Klosko’s multiple principle theory of political obligation; combining the failing justifications of Natural Duty, Fairness and the Promotion of the Common Good, into a comprehensive justification for the existence of a general moral obligation to obey the law: George Klosko employs three concepts in order to combine the principles of Natural Duty, fairness and the promotion of the common good into a single comprehensive unifying theory. He labels these three concepts as cumulation, mutual support and overlap. He describes these three principles in the following way: ‘First is what we call cumulation. Different principles can cover different services provided by the state, and so by combining principles, a larger range of state services can be accounted for. Second is what can be referred to as mutual support. In regard to certain state functions, if a given principle on its own cannot justify compliance, the problem might possibly be overcome by more than one principle working in tandem. The third way is simple overlap. The intuition here is that, while requirements to obey given laws could be relatively weak, these can be strengthened by support of additional principles.[20]’ These three concepts admit that individually arguments of Natural duty, fairness and those argument pertaining to the common good must fail in their task of explaining and identifying a general moral duty to obey the law, but using these three principles as described above, he purports to show how these failing arguments can be combined to successfully address those limitations. The principle of culmination serves to suggest that the main limitation of these theories is their applicability to a limited area of state function, i.e. the services that the state provides to its citizens. Mutual support deals with the limitations of these individual arguments in relation to their attempt to justify a general moral obligation to obey the law, and the overlap principle deals with the respective weaknesses of each of these individual arguments, very much in the same way as we have done earlier in this essay. Klosko argues that a theory that only purports to account for one type of state function cannot be said to lead to a general duty to obey the law. He argues that state functions are social facts, and as such the failure of theorists to account for the variety of these functions in their theories is a factual failure in their arguments, a factual failure which must therefore lead to conclusions which are non-comprehensive and cannot therefore be said to give rise to the general moral duty to obey the law which they purport to do. Whilst prima facie I can see the point that Klosko is making; each of these theories do work to a certain extent, the problem being that we are always able to find many situations which exist where the theories fail to hold up to scrutiny. What Klosko has therefore tried to do is to incorporate these theories together, so that when one of them fails, another justification can step in to uphold our position of there being a general moral duty to obey the law. Whilst at first this may seem somewhat artificial, at least Klosko has tried to justify the fusion of these very different arguments by reference to state function. One cant help however feeling that some of the failures of the very individual justifications that he is using, rather than being simply due to their limited scope [by virtue of differing state functions], are so fundamental as to render any fusion of them inappropriate. By the end of this essay I shall hopefully have demonstrated that the best analysis of the question of whether or not there is a general moral duty to obey the law does not result from any of these individual arguments, neither from the fusion of them, but rather from a wholly new conceptualization of the character of the obligation and duty itself. Let us now turn to the position 2 theorists, and see if we can find some compelling arguments amongst their writing: Defending Position [2]; there may be a prima facie obligation to obey some laws, but such a duty cannot be a general one: M.B.E. Smith is commonly known as an advocate of this position. In his earlier work, ‘Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’ he performs an analysis of all the arguments which purport to support the existence of a ‘position [1]’ duty to obey the law, providing successful counter arguments for each, and finally concluding as a result these analyses that the true answer to the question of whether or not there is a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law must reside at ‘position [2];’ whether or not there is such a duty to obey the law depends entirely upon which law in question is being obeyed/disobeyed i.e. there will only sometimes be a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law. Defeating Position [2]; Simply because we cannot find adequate justification for the existence of a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law does not mean that we must, by default, resort to the conclusion that the most accurate description of this normative phenomenon is that of there only sometimes being a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law: Simply because we cannot find adequate justification for the existence of a general prima facie moral duty to obey the law does not mean that we must, by default, resort to the simplistic conclusion that the most accurate description of this normative phenomenon is that of there only sometimes being a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law. Joseph Raz, in his ‘Theory of Justice’ (1971) argues this point exactly. He does not understand why theorists have not ventured to reach a compromise between position [1] and position [2], especially in light of the fact that it seems so clear that the true answer must lie somewhere between these two extreme positions. Raz therefore proposed such a theory. The compromise between position [1] and position [2]; J. Raz, in search of a new characterisation: Earlier in this essay we discussed the character of the duty in question. We argued that whilst the duty will never be an absolute one, neither is it realistic to suggest that such a duty will be generally prima facie in character. To reiterate those arguments, for the duty to be absolute is to deny a place for individual reasoning and autonomy in a society; if every law must be obeyed regardless of any extraneous personal beliefs or opinions, then personal practical morality is denied. Likewise, if the duty was prima facie in character, the ability of the law to retain social order and manage social conflicts may come into question; Raz therefore decided that an alternative characterisation of the obligation was required, and so was born the notion of an ‘absolute reason’, or, as it has become known by certain other jurists[21], ‘the exclusionary reason.’ Let us now consider exactly what Raz understands by it: Raz’s new characterisation of the obligation to obey the law: Raz introduces the idea of there being two orders of practical reason; first-order reasons and second order reasons. These reasons are ‘practical’ in that they are the kind of reasons that may feature in an individual’s decision process when that individual is attempting to decide upon a particular course of action, i.e. reasons to act or to refrain from acting for a reason. Second order reasons are higher in priority that first-order reasons, and as such, if two such reasons should come into conflict, it will be the second-order reason that shall prevail. Second-order reasons however might themselves be trumped by what Raz describes as ‘cancelling-reasons’, reasons which might exist within the context of the particular decision process at hand which could render the secondary-reasons void. The jurisdiction of a ‘cancelling-reason’, i.e. its scope within the context of a particular decision, will be affected by what Raz calls ‘scope -affecting reasons.’ Exclusionary reasons are second-order reasons of a special kind; whereas all the other types of reasons may be distinguished by their ground, exclusionary reasons have a special normative role to play in the whole practical deliberative process, and it is this normative role by which exclusionary reasons should be distinguished. In effect therefore, ‘A second-order reason is any reason to act or to refrain from acting for a reason, whereas an exclusionary reason is a second-order reason to refrain from acting for some reason.[22]’ Exclusionary reasons exclude other secondary reasons from playing their normal role in the deliberative process, in effect cancelling these otherwise valid reasons from the decision making process. To best understand the nature of these exclusionary reasons, and how they operate within the practical decision making process, let us follow through Raz’s very argument for the existence of these special secondary reasons: Raz commences his argument with an analysis of a couple of examples of the decision-making process. The first example scenario involves an agent who refuses to accept a business deal on the basis that he is too tired to think about whether or not the deal could be advantageous to him. Raz explains how the decision making process in this example did not involve the processing of the actual fact pertaining to the deal in question, but rather on the basis that she realised that she was too tired to perform a thorough assessment, and as such decided to play safe and decline. In this case, the first order reasons would be the facts relating to the deal, and these are trumped by the second-order reason of tiredness. Raz then proposes the situation where a colleague of the agent, another like-minded agent of similar financial status, decides to accept an identical deal; this may prove to be an adequate reason for the agent, despite her tiredness and inability to assess all the intricacies o f the deal, to accept the deal. In such a case, we could say that the fact that the other agent accepted the deal serves as a reason for her to accept it herself. This reason does not outweigh the tiredness reason, nor does it undermine it, but it does result in a different outcome to her decision-making process. The second example scenario offered by Raz is as follows: ‘While serving in the army Jeremy is ordered by his commanding officer to appropriate and use a van belonging to a certain tradesman. Therefore he has reason to appropriate the van. His friend urges him to disobey the order pointing to weighty reasons for doing so. Jeremy does not deny that his friend may have a case. But, he claims, it does not matter whether he is right or not. Orders are orders and should be obeyed even if wrong, even if no harm will come from disobeying them. That is what it means to be a subordinate’[23]. According to Raz, the order given to Jeremy by his commanding officer should be regarded as an exclusionary reason in that it excludes the reasons offered to him by his friend, from featuring in his practical deliberative process, despite the fact that these reasons were sound in nature. This is what Raz means by ‘exclusionary reasons.’ As stated above, these reasons are disting uishable by virtue of their normative role, a role which Raz describes as â€Å"†¦reasons for performing certain actions, and, other things being equal, the fact that they are excluded by an exclusionary reason merely means that they should not be complied with, not that they should not be conformed to. The best course is if they are indirectly obeyed, i.e. if the action they indicate is performed for some other, independent, reason.[24]’ Let us now apply this characterization to our general duty to obey the law. The first thing which becomes evident is that the duty to obey the law can itself be described as an exclusionary reason; when we state that someone is under a duty to obey the law, we are effectively stating that in the decision process of that person, reliance on extra-legal considerations in the formulation of the decision of whether or not to act in such a way has no actual place in that process. Such extra-legal considerations are thus excluded from the practical decision making process by the very existence of a duty to obey the law. One might argue here that an analysis of the duty in this way yields no different results to that of the characterization of the duty as an absolute one. In fact, whilst the result may very well be the same, the description of the duty as an exclusionary reason does give respect to the existence of a balancing decision making process, in a way which an absolute conception would not; as Menendez[25] writes, â€Å"the duty to obey the law, when conceptualized as an exclusionary reason, precludes direct weighting and balancing, but it does not rule out a margin of exercise of practical reason. This is enough to render compatible the obligation with individual autonomy.† Raz’s picture of the duty to obey the law is certainly the most convincing to date; although somewhat contrived, it does manage to reconcile legal and moral duty in a way which allows the law to retain a legitimate authority, whilst respecting the fact that human beings are essentially autonomous in their decision making. Let us now see if we can find any criticisms of Raz’s

Our Schools Need Community Service Learning Programs Essay -- Communit

"I don't know what your destiny will be, but one thing I do know: the only ones among you who will be really happy are those who have sought and found how to serve." - Albert Schweitzer Each community is like a human body, it requires a constant life force to survive. Volunteers and community service workers are the blood that maintains our communities. It fortifies our foundations. A community is only as strong as the weakest link. We must empower those weakened by poverty, discrimination and other social injustices. Compassion is a learned behavior. We obtain it through our parents initially teaching us morals such as empathy, kindness, and fairness. Secondly, we can reinforce it through school-based service learning projects. Mandatory school-based community service learning will benefit our country by an increase in volunteerism from the heart and social skills in our children and teens in the future.Service is your engagement in the relationship of the act of giving. Service is its most sincere when we help through whom we are not by what we do. We have to have compassion in order to serve correctly to be in the situation with someone not just for them (Wade, Rahima C., 1997). Volunteerism is embedded in the fibers of Americans. For centuries we have aided our society in all aspects of volunteerism. Harvard University, in 1636, formed the first academic library which was staffed with volunteers. In 1736, the first Volunteer Fire Department was established; in 1857 the American Red Cross was organized using volunteer labor(Megan 2011). As volunteers, will we promote charity or solidarity? Charity exhibits as insincere, superior, and often views the poor as sub-human. Solidarity presents ... ...g-Youth O’Sullivan, Theresa A., Community Service in The United States, Alternatives to improve volunteerism among Americans, Tallahassee, FL August 2004 Vessels, G., & Huitt, W. (2005). Moral and character development. Paper presented at the National Youth at Risk Conference, Savannah, GA, March 8-10. Retrieved [date], from http://www.edpsycinteractive.org/papers/chardev.pdf http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harris_Wofford Wade, Rahima C. "From a Distance: Service- Learning and Social Justice." Integrating Service Learning and Multicultural Education in Colleges and Universities . Ed. Carolyn R. O'Grady. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000. Youth helping America educating for active citizenship: service learning, school-based service and youth engagement 3/2006 Publisher: Corporation for National and Community Service. http://www.nationalservice.gov/